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INTRODUCTION
In asserting that law is a profession and not a business, lawyers
often refer to the role self-governance plays in the legal profession.
Julius Henry Cohen captured this sentiment in making the following
exhortation: "Ours is a profession .... We are all in a boat. The sins
of one of us are the sins of all of us. Come, gentlemen, let us clean
house."' As members of a profession, Cohen asserts that lawyers may
be brought to prompt and summary accountability through a
collective enterprise.2
* Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics, Maurice A. Deane
School of Law at Hofstra University. I thank the members of the Fordham Urban
Law Journal, Professors Bruce Green, Sam Levine, and Russ Pearce for inviting me
to participate in the conference The Law: Business or Profession? Thanks also to
Professors Monroe Freedman, Stephen Gillers, and Joan Loughrey for their
comments. Finally, thanks to my research assistants, Steven Hollander and Chris
Leo.
1. JuLIus HENRY COHEN, THE LAw, BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 109 (1924)
(referring to the "germ of the American guild-idea").
2. Id. at 22-23 (asserting that one destroys the basis of professional discipline if
one makes the law a business).
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When Cohen and other bar leaders speak of accountability, their
focus is often on the role that professional discipline plays in
protecting the public. A similar concern relates to protecting the
public by limiting law practice to attorneys who complete a course of
education and demonstrate the requisite character befitting a member
of the bar.
In his essays, Cohen recognizes the disparate positions of lawyers
and their clients. For example, he notes that clients may not have the
background or expertise to make informed judgments in retaining a
lawyer.' Because lawyers stand in a position of trust and confidence,
Cohen advocates limiting law practice to persons who possess
"adequate learning and purity of character."' This approach to public
protection targets the qualities of those who enter the door of the
profession. Once admitted, the focus turns to policing those
practitioners whose conduct runs afoul of the minimum standards to
avoid professional discipline.6  Far less attention is devoted to
considering accountability of lawyers who depart from standards of
care applicable in professional liability cases.
This Article will address this gap by examining accountability in
the context of professional liability. To do so, it will consider select
developments that required lawyers, the organized bar, legislators,
and jurists to balance lawyer self-interest and public protection.
Specifically, this Article will consider lawyers' collective campaign to
limit their vicarious liability, as well as developments related to
lawyers carrying legal malpractice insurance. An examination of
legislation and regulatory decisions related to lawyers' professional
liability over the last two decades reveals that accountability concerns
may not have been adequately considered because of the absence of
advocacy on behalf of consumers and the public. For lawyers and law
professors committed to advancing the status of law as a profession,
this Article ends by urging them to take steps to promote financial
responsibility as a basic tenet of professionalism and to support
initiatives that protect consumers injured by lawyers' professional
misconduct.
3. See generally id. at 125-41 (calling for more demanding educational
requirements for lawyers). The chapter ends by noting that "Education for the Bar
must include moral training-if it is to be education for the Bar." Id. at 141.
4. Id. at 288. Cohen suggests that the "poor, ignorant and helpless" need more
protection than more sophisticated clients because they are less likely to exercise
judgment in hiring lawyers. Id.
5. Id.
6. See generally id. at 3-22.
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I. THE LIMTED LIABILITY MOVEMENT: WHERE WERE THE
LAWYERS?
Over the last century, the limited liability movement resulted in the
most radical departure from a civil liability regime holding lawyers
accountable for the acts and omissions of their law partners. Unlike
the business and tax-related interests behind allowing lawyers to
practice in professional corporations, the push behind the limited
liability partnership structure was the desire of lawyers to limit their
vicarious liability for their partners' professional malpractice.! In
lawyers' campaign for limited liability, public protection was largely a
secondary concern.' While a few states included insurance
requirements and other protections to provide some degree of public
protection, injured parties' ability to hold firm partners jointly and
severally liable was virtually eliminated once the law firm converted
to limited liability status.9 As the limited liability structure spread
nationwide, few lawyers and commentators critically questioned the
limited liability organizational structure as a retreat from public
protection in favor of lawyer protection. The following account of the
genesis and growth of the limited liability partnership form illustrates
that lawyers' own interest in self-protection dominated both the
discourse and outcome.
7. See Robert W. Hillman, Organizational Choices of Professional Serice
Firms: An Empirical Study, 58 Bus. LAW. 1387, 1391-96 (2006) (tracing the
development of professional corporations, limited liability companies, and limited
liability partnerships). Although similar issues arise with respect to all limited
liability vehicles that lawyers use to avoid vicarious liability, this Article focuses on
the development and effect of the limited liability partnership structure. Unlike the
professional corporation and limited liability company structures, the LLP form
stemmed solely from lawyers' desire to escape liability for the acts and omissions of
their partners.
8. For a discussion of the successful and rapid campaign of lawyers to gain
limited liability protection, see Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in the Crucible
of Lawyer Self-Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEx. L. REv. 359,
360 (1998). Professor Wolfram warned that injured claimants "will end up paying for
the gains lawyers thereby achieved." Id.; see also Susan Saab Fortney, Seeking
Shelter in the Minefield of Unintended Consequences-the Traps of Limited
Liability Law Finns, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 717, 724-29 (1997) (analyzing the
internal and external consequences of converting to limited liability law firms).
9. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN
ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr,
AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr (2001) 165-66 tbl.3-1 (2011)
(outlining statutory approaches to limit partners' liability for partnership debts and
obligations). Only a few states impose insurance requirements in the LLP statute as
a substitute for a partner's individual liability. Id. § 2.06.
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The birth of the LLP structure dates back to the 1980s and the
savings and loan debacle involving the collapse of numerous financial
institutions insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation." In an
effort to recoup hundreds of millions in losses, the government filed
numerous cases against lawyers, accountants, and other professionals,
alleging that the defendants' conduct caused the financial institutions
(and eventually the government) to suffer damages.n In addition to
suing the professionals' firms, the government pursued claims against
individual law firm partners, including those who were directly
involved in the representation of the failed institutions, as well as
other partners whose liability arose from their status as general
partners in the defendant law firms.12 In various cases, the amount of
damages that the government alleged far exceeded the amount of
legal malpractice insurance available to the defendant firms."
To many, the government appeared to have both an unlimited war
chest and zeal to recover as much as possible, even if it meant
10. For insights on the evolution of the LLP structure from the vantage point of
the law professor who served as chair of the legislative committee for a Texas non-
profit group organized to support business-related legislation, see Robert W.
Hamilton, Registered Limited Liabihty Partnerships, Present at the Birth (Nearly),
66 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1065 (1995).
11. See Ethan S. Burger, The Use of Limited Liability Entities for the Pracce of
Law: Have Lawyers Been Lulled into a False Sense of Security?, 40 TEx. J. Bus. L.
175, 179 (2004) (describing the government's efforts to recoup billions lost in
connection with the savings and loan crisis).
12. In an attempt to maximize recovery, the government asserted both vicarious
liability and direct liability claims against firm attorneys who were not directly
involved in the representation. The direct liability claims asserted that partners have
an affirmative duty to monitor their peers. For an analysis of the government's
allegations, see Susan Saab Fortney, AmIMyPartner's Keeper?Peer Reviewin Law
Firms, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 329, 329-35 (1995). See also John S. Dzienkowski, Legal
Malpractice and the Multistate Firm: Supervision of Multistate Offices; Firms as
Limited Liability Partnersips; and Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Chent
Malpractice Claims, 36 S. TEx. L. REv. 967, 981 n.68 (1995) (noting that in a high-
profile case the government sued firm partners regardless of whether they were at the
defendant firm at the time of suit). "By doing this, the government was suing
different firms with different insurance policies and thus sought to obtain judgments
against as many potential defendants as possible." Id.
13. While in private practice, I represented a legal malpractice carrier that insured
a number of law firms sued by the government in connection with failed financial
institutions. In connection with the claims against Jenkens & Gilchrest (J & G), the
carrier attempted to obtain a declaratory judgment allowing it to tender to the court
the amount remaining under the policy's limits of liability. After the trial court
denied the petition, the government settled the cases against the insured law firm.
Thereafter, the government continued to pursue claims to recover amounts under
insurance policies issued to other firms who hired former J & G partners.
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pursuing the personal assets of partners who were not directly
involved in this representation of the failed financial institutions.14
This was dramatically played out in litigation against Jenkens &
Gilchrest (J & G), the now defunct Dallas-based law firm. In a
meeting with J & G lawyers and their defense counsel, government
lawyers made their intentions clear when they used an overhead
projector to show their analysis of the non-exempt net worth of J & G
partners."
Beyond the individual defendants involved in the actions filed by
the federal agencies, the litigation and the government's aggressive
posture captured the attention of thousands of lawyers who
represented financial institutions." Other lawyers familiar with the
litigation became concerned about the prospect of "innocent"
partners being held jointly and severally liable for the acts and
omissions of their peers."
In Lubbock, Texas, the city where the government had sued J & G
in federal court, partners in Crenshaw, Dupree and Milam (CDM), a
twenty-one-person law firm, first proposed the limited liability
partnership concept. Because this was an established principle of
partnership law, the CDM lawyers evidently recognized that it would
take legislative action to eliminate unlimited liability for partners'
malpractice." The proponents elicited the assistance of a powerful
state senator who introduced Texas Senate Bill 302, exclusively
providing for limited liability for certain classes of professionals,
including lawyers and accountants.' The legislation eliminated
vicarious liability for torts claims by adding the following language to
the Texas version of the Uniform Partnership Act:
A partner in a professional partnership is not individually liable,
except to the extent of the partner's interest in partnership property,
for the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence or malfeasance
committed in the course of rendering professional service on behalf
14. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1069 (noting that the government agencies
devoted a "significant part of their total resources to the recovery of funds lost in the
collapse of Texas institutions").
15. Id. at 1071.
16. Id. (referring to the thousands of lawyers who watched the litigation unfold
with the "but for the grace of God go I" reaction).
17. See Burger, supra note 11, at 178 (describing the confluence of events that
motivated lawyers to seek liability protection).
18. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1066-74 (tracing the origin of the LLP
concept and legislative initiatives).
19. Id. at 1072-73.
20. See id.; see also BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 3.
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of the partnership by another partner, employee, or representation
of the partnership.
The bill that created a "limited liability partnership" structure
passed the Texas Senate with little attention or comment.
The initial reception in the Texas House of Representatives was far
more negative.' In the House, critics questioned the following
features of the proposed legislation:
(1) Including only professionals, particularly lawyers,
(2) Relieving partners from responsibility for misconduct of those
they directed or supervised (such as a doctor's nurse or technician, a
lawyer's junior associate),
(3) Failing to signal to patients and clients that their professionals'
liability was limited in complete reversal of historic and familiar
partnership law, and
(4) Failing to provide any substitute source of recovery for injured
patients and clients.
Despite these objections, the pressure to pass the legislation was
substantial. Professor Alan R. Bromberg, a partnership law expert
who had originally criticized the limited liability concept at the House
hearing, later agreed to draft revisions to the bill to make it more
acceptable.' The revisions were designed to address the concerns by
doing the following:
(1) Extending the liability limitation to all partnerships,
(2) Denying protection to partners for misconduct of those working
under their supervision or direction,
(3) Requiring annual registration [of the firm] with the state and the
inclusion of "L.L.P." or "registered limited liability partnership in
the firm name," and
(4) Requiring [the L.L.P. to carry] liability insurance in an arbitrary
and admittedly often inadequate amount of $100,000.
With these changes, the revised bill was "quietly attached" to an
omnibus bill proposed by the Texas Business Law Foundation, a not-
21. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 3.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1073 (identifying some of the criticisms).
24. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 4.
25. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1073-74.
26. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 4.
182 [ ol. XL
2012] THE ROLE OFA CCOUNTABILITY 183
for-profit corporation organized by a group of corporate lawyers from
major Texas law firms.
With the enactment of the first limited liability legislation in Texas,
the ember of change that started in a conference room of a small law
firm in Lubbock, Texas spread like wildfire.' State by state,
professionals lobbied for adoption of new legislation, arguing that it
would be essential for the state to remain competitive in attracting
and retaining business.29
While lawyers and bar-related groups were lobbying for adoption
of limited liability statutes, there appeared to be little resistance to
passing legislation. One Texas legislator who was a partner with a
plaintiff's firm first questioned the proposed Texas legislation as a
"radical and undesirable proposal."o After some changes were made,
the legislator withdrew his opposition." Consumer and client
advocacy groups also did not play a significant role in challenging
sweeping changes that allowed lawyers to practice in limited liability
firms.32
27. Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1072, 1074 (noting that Democratic Governor
Ann Richards allowed the bill to become effective without her signature). While
lawyers and bar-related groups were pushing for adoption of limited liability statutes,
there appeared to be little resistance to passing legislation. Id. One Texas legislator
who was a partner with a plaintiffs firm first questioned the proposed Texas
legislation as a "radical and undesirable proposal." Id. at 1073. After some changes
were made, the legislator withdrew his opposition. Id.
28. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 12 ("In 1994, 13 states adopted
LLP provisions ... [and] [a]bout the same number had adopted LLP during only the
first half of 1995."). Around the world, various jurisdictions (including the United
Kingdom and Canadian provinces) recognize the LLP form. Id. at 17.
29. See Elizabeth S. Miller, The Perils and Pitfalls of Practicing Law in a Texas
Limited Liability Partnership, 43 TEx. TECH L. REV. 563, 564 (2011) ("The [LLP]
concept was quickly copied in other states, and all states and the District of Columbia
have since added LLP provisions to their partnership statutes.").
30. Hamilton, supra note 10, at 1073. "Two other legislators argued to lawyer
witnesses, 'You want your cake and yet you want to eat it too,' and 'If you want to
swim with the sharks, you should recognize that you might get eaten by them."' Id
Others questioned whether the bill was necessary because lawyers could limit their
liability as Professional Corporations and resisted the legislation as "help-a-lawyer
bill." Id.
31. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 4.
32. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Who Bears the Costs of Lawyes'Mistakes?-
Against Limited Liabihty, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 885, 889 (2004) (noting that "legislatures
adopted the new limited liability entity formats with minimal inquiry into normative
consequences").
184 FORDHAM URB. L [Vol. XL
As the limited liability movement spread across the nation, the
protection that legislation provided actually expanded." As noted
above, the first proposed legislation initially only protected
professionals.' The first statute that was adopted did not restrict
protection to professionals, but limited the liability shield to vicarious
liability claims relating to the malpractice of another firm partner.'
In addition, the statute did not protect partners if another firm
partner or representative working under the supervision or direction
of the first partner committed the malpractice.' In this sense, the first
Texas statute only provided a "partial shield" because it only covered
tort-type claims and preserved supervisory liability. Subsequent
statutes broadened the liability shield. For example, the Delaware
legislation covered contract as well as tort claims, and it narrowed
supervisory liability to misconduct of someone under the partners'
"direct supervision and control."" Subsequently, other states
eliminated the provisions that preserved vicarious liability for acts
and omissions of supervised persons.' By 2008, eighty percent of the
states had adopted "full-shield" statutes, providing a liability shield
for all debts and obligations of the partnership."
Bar association groups eagerly supported LLP legislation that
eliminated "even the moderate restrictions on limited liability."'
Most notably, the American Bar Association (ABA), Business Law
Section Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business
Organizations Working Group on Registered Limited Liability
Partnerships prepared prototype provisions for inclusion in the
33. For an account of how Delaware and other states expanded the statutory
protection to extend to all liabilities, see BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, §
1.01(b).
34. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
35. Miller, supra note 29, at 564 (describing the evolution of the Texas statute that
originally shielded partners only from liability "arising out of the errors, omissions,
negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance of other partners or representatives of the
partnership"). Later, "[i]n 1997, the LLP provisions in the Texas Revised
Partnership Act were amended to provide protection from all debts and obligations
of the partnership." Id. at 564-65. Most statutes now eliminate partners' vicarious
liability for all types of classes of claims. BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, §
101(c)-(d).
36. For a discussion of the unresolved issues related to supervisory liability, see
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 126-28.
37. Id. at 10-11.
38. See id. at 165-69 tbl.3-1 (outlining the different approaches to supervisory
liability).
39. Id. at 15.
40. Id. at 14.
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Revised Uniform Partnership Act."' These provisions limited
vicarious liability for all kinds of debts and extended protection to
persons other than practicing professionals.42
At the American Law Institute (ALI), a tentative draft of the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers included a section
subjecting principals in a law firm to vicarious liability for the
wrongful acts of firm principals and employees.43 At the 1997 annual
meeting, ALI members rejected this approach, adopting a version
that recognized lawyers' ability to limit their liability." The ALI vote
on the Restatement section related to the liability of firm principals
exemplifies how lawyer self-interest influenced what should have
been an impartial restatement of legal principles. In an insightful
assessment of ALI deliberations and decisions on the content of the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, Professor
Monroe Freedman zeroed in on ALI members' "conflict of interest"
in allowing their independent judgment to be "materially and
adversely affected by their own financial interests.""
Other bar-related groups, such as Professional Ethics Committees,
also greased the way for law firms to practice as limited liability
partnerships. Both the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Professional Ethics and various state ethics
committees opined that practice in limited liability firms did not
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Fortney, supra note 12, at 360 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1994)).
44. Id at 362. The ALI membership adopted the following provision: "Each of
the principals of a law firm organized as a general partnership without lmited
liability is liable jointly and severally with the firm." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58 (2000) (emphasis added). Based on this final
version, Professors Bromberg and Ribstein state that the "Restatement explicitly
recognizes limitation of lawyers' liability in LLPs under applicable law." BROMBERG
& RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 258-59.
45. See Monroe H. Freedman, Caveat Lector: Conflicts of Interest of ALI
Members in Drafting the Restatements, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 646-60 (1998)
(analyzing three different issues that illustrate how lawyers' own financial interests
affected their independence in formulating sections of the Restatement of Law
Governing Lawyers).
46. Id. Professor Freedman warns that these conflicts of interest
have compromised the integrity of the ALI's Restatements of the Law to
the point that no judge, scholar, or student can rely on a Restatement rule
or comment as representing the objective judgment of members, unaffected
by the partisanship of advocates who are creating precedents to protect
their clients' and their own interests in future litigation.
Id. at 660.
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violate applicable ethics rules, provided that firms comply with
statutory provisions, such as those requiring that the firms use the
words "Limited Liability Partnership" or the initials "LLP" in their
name.47  Disappointingly, few opinions urged lawyers to take
additional steps to communicate their limited liability status to clients
and prospective clients.'
Bar leaders and other lawyers who preached the status of law as a
profession said little about how the limited liability movement
dramatically changed the remedies available to persons injured by
lawyers' acts and omissions.49 Rather, lawyers operated out of self-
interest.o In contrasting "professionalism" rhetoric with the bar's
role in lobbying for limited liability protection for lawyers, Professor
Roger C. Cramton observed:
In any setting in which lawyer professionalism is discussed, the
profession laments the decline of mentoring in law firms and urges
greater quality control measures. Yet [in pushing for the enactment
of state legislation eliminating the traditional rule that a law
partner's assets are at risk when a firm member's negligence leads to
a malpractice or third-party award] it rejected the principles of
monitoring, group responsibility and quality control that underlie
the traditional partnership rule. Pocket-book interests have
prevailed over "traditional professional values." Also, the organized
bar usually takes the position that state legislatures have no business
regulating the profession. But when the common law rule proved
47. For a critique of the ABA Ethics Opinion, see Susan Saab Fortney,
Professional Responsibility and Liability Issues Related to Limited Liability
Partnerships, 39 S. TEx. L. REV. 339,405-22 (1998).
48. In Wisconsin, the Supreme Court recognized that lawyers seeking limited
liability should do more than comply with the minimum statutory provisions. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court amended the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, allowing lawyers to practice in LLPs and other
limited liability organizations, provided that the lawyers give public and actual notice
to clients. Wis. Sup. Cr. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCr FOR ATrORNEYS R. 20:5.7. The rule
imposes other conditions, including that a limited liability law firm "[i]nclude a
written designation of the limited liability structure as part of its name." Id. In
addition, the firm must "[p]rovide to clients and potential clients in writing a plain-
English summary of the features of the limited liability law under which [the firm] is
organized." Id.
49. See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 362 (noting that the bar played a pivotal role in
pushing for limited liability legislation).
50. Id.
186  Vol. XL
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threatening, the bar sought and obtained immediate legislative
action in many states.
Although professionals successfully lobbied for the enactment of
limited liability legislation, state supreme courts could have exercised
their inherent authority to prohibit or regulate practice in limited
liability law firms.s2 The vast majority acceded to the popular will of
lawyers, doing little to stem the tide.53 In contrast to many, the
Illinois Supreme Court resisted the pressure to simply bless allowing
lawyers to practice in limited liability firms.' After an extended
period of study and submissions by interested groups, the Illinois
Supreme Court eventually adopted a rule that allowed lawyers to
limit their liability, provided that they complied with safeguards in the
rule, including insurance and financial responsibility provisions.55
51. Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversary System
and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1613 n.48
(2002).
52. "Bar associations have played a pivotal, if not very public, role in obtaining
the legislation. Indeed, very few bar groups opposed the legislation, and their
opposition can be adequately explained on the ground of self-interest." Wolfram,
supra note 8, at 362 (analyzing the inherent powers doctrine and courts' response to
the organized bar's push for limited liability legislation). According to Professor
Wolfram, the state's highest court claim of exclusive "inherent powers" is embodied
in two principles:
The milder version of the claim involves judicial assertion of a constitutional
power to regulate lawyers even in the absence of legislation. Quite beyond
that, most state supreme courts also claim the exclusive power to regulate
lawyers as the court sees fit-even if the state's legislature has enacted
legislation that on its face is applicable to lawyers. Under the latter claim,
courts say they have both the power and the duty to strike down legislation
interfering with the judicial power to regulate lawyers.
Id.
53. Id. ("In contrast to the robust and highly successful bar activity, [Professor
Wolfram notes] that most courts have not been involved in the LLP adoption process
in any way.").
54. The Illinois Bar Association and Chicago Bar Association petitioned the
Illinois Supreme Court, proposing rules to allow lawyers to use statutory vehicles to
limit lawyers' vicarious liability. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted rules "nearly
identical" to those proposed in the petition. See Sheldon I. Banoff & Steven F.
Pflaum, Limited Liability Legal Practice: New Opportunities and Responsibilities for
Illinois Lawyers, CBA RECORD (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.kattenlaw.com/files/Publication/577a24dc-3a89-446f-a62a-
e577ba99ada0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f08f5eab-12c9-44c4-bbf4-
5bf5c287bOdc/Limited%2OLiability%2OLegal%20Practice.pdf (providing a detailed
analysis of the Illinois approach from the perspectives of authors who participated in
the drafting of the petition submitted to the Illinois Supreme Court).
55. Until Illinois adopted the rule, it was the only state that imposed unlimited
vicarious liability on principals in law firms. Illinois Rule 722 on Limited Liability
Legal Practice now allows lawyers to limit their liability under the applicable state
FORDHAM URB. L [
Unlike the first Texas legislation, which merely required that firms
carry limits of liability of $100,000, the Illinois rule set the minimum
limits of liability for professional liability insurance as $100,000 per
claim and $250,000 annual aggregate, multiplied by the number of
lawyers in the firm, provided that the firm's insurance need not
exceed $5,000,000 per claim and $10,000,000 annual aggregate.
Through this rule, Illinois imposed meaningful financial responsibility
requirements on lawyers seeking to limit their liability.
Although a few other jurisdictions used insurance to address
questions of public protection, most jurisdictions did not.' Therefore,
consumers in most states lost the unlimited liability protection
afforded under general partnership law with limited or no assurance
that firms would carry insurance or maintain assets adequate to pay
claims." Had a public watchdog or consumer advocate group been
more involved in monitoring the limited liability movement, the
question is whether decision-makers would have imposed adequate
insurance requirements as the cost of doing business in a limited
liability firm.
II. MANDATORY LEGAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: How THE
UNITED STATES DIFFERS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES (IN NOT
PROTECTING CONSUMERS)
As the limited liability form spread to other countries, insurance
need not be used as a quid pro quo for eliminating vicarious liability
statutes provided that the entity maintains adequate insurance or proof of financial
responsibility as defined in the Rule. See ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 722(b)(1).
56. As an alternative to purchasing insurance, the Illinois Rule provides that law
firms may maintain proof of financial responsibility in a sum no less than the
minimum required annual aggregate for adequate insurance for a limited liability
entity. Under the Rule, "proof of financial responsibility" means funds that are
"specifically designated and segregated for the satisfaction of any judgments against a
limited liability entity, and any of its owners or employees, entered by or registered in
any court of competent jurisdiction in Illinois, arising out of wrongful conduct." ILL.
Sup. Cr. R. 722(b)(3) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, at 64-65 (identifying eight statutes
that impose insurance requirements). In some states, other applicable law, such as
licensing statutes or professional conduct rules, may require insurance or financial
responsibility for limited liability firms. Id. at 65.
58. See Petition of the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois State Bar
Association at 1, In re Proposed Rules Regulating Vicarious Liability of Lawyers
Practicing in Limited Liability Entities, No. 18095 (Ill. Mar. 27, 2002) (arguing that
the protections in the proposed rule provided "more effective [protection] than
vicarious liability as a means of ensuring that clients receive compensation for losses
suffered due to malpractice").
188 [ Vol. XL
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of firm principals. Around the world, injured persons (as well as
lawyers) were already protected because other jurisdictions, including
most common law countries, require professional indemnity
insurance for practicing lawyers." For example, law firms in the
United Kingdom (UK) must carry at least £2,000,000 per claim and a
limited liability company must carry at least £3,000,000 per claim.' In
its Handbook explaining standards of practice, the Solicitors
Regulation Authority (SRA), the new national regulator in the UK,
advises solicitors that they need professional indemnity insurance to
practice.' The Law Society for England and Wales describes the
justification for mandating that solicitors maintain professional
indemnity insurance (PII) as follows:
PII also increases your financial security and serves an important
public interest function by covering civil liability claims, including:
certain related defence costs, and regulatory awards made against
you. It ensures that the public does not suffer loss as a result of your
civil liability, which might otherwise be uncompensated. This is
important in maintaining public confidence in the integrity and
standing of solicitors.62
Regulators from other countries share this perspective in asserting
that PII protects consumers as well as lawyers.' Mandatory insurance
protects injured persons who otherwise would be facing uncollectable
losses because lawyers "go bare," practicing with no insurance or
inadequate limits of liability on their policies.' Requiring minimum
limits and types of insurance protects lawyers and clients from gaps in
59. Jennifer Ip & Nora Rock, Mandatory Professional Indemnity Insurance and a
Mandatory Insurer: A Global Perpective, 10 LAwPRO MAG. 2,10-11 (2011).
60. Id. at 10 (discussing the increased difficulty UK firms encountered in
obtaining affordable PII for the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 insurance years). For a
table of PII requirements worldwide, see Professional Indemnity Insurance
Requirements Around the World, PRACTICEPRO, http://practicepro.ca/LawPROmag/
ProfessionallndemnityAroundWorld.pdf (last visited Aug. 23,2012).
61. Professional Liability Insurance, L. Soc'y § 3.2 (July 4, 2012),
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-notes/professional-indemnity-
insurance/.
62. Id.
63. "In most common law jurisdictions, professional indemnity insurance for
lawyers is made mandatory by law or by law society or bar association regulation." Ip
& Rock, supra note 59, at 11 (citing Professional Indemnity Insurance Requirements
Around the World, LAwPRO MAG., http://www.practicepro.ca/LAWPROMag/
Professionallndemnity.AroundWorld.pdf (last visited Jan. 29,2013)).
6 4. Id.
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coverage." Mandatory insurance also addresses the moral hazard of
some uninsured lawyers negatively affecting the reputation of the
legal profession when injured persons are left without recovery."
Finally, mandatory insurance may improve the accessibility and
affordability of insurance.7
Interestingly, the need to create a source for affordable insurance is
what prompted Oregon decision makers to enact a mandatory
insurance program in the 1970s." A brief historical note on legal
malpractice insurance and the evolution of the Oregon system
provides another example of how market forces and lawyer self-
interest sparked change.
In the United States, legal malpractice insurance first gained
prominence in the 1960s when property and casualty insurers offered
legal malpractice insurance as an ancillary service." Lawyers became
keenly interested in obtaining insurance in the 1970s when legal
malpractice claims increased substantially. Many insurers
responded to these claims by changing their approaches to
underwriting and by sharply raising premiums." Other insurance
companies simply discontinued writing legal malpractice insurance in
certain states.72  Because of these changes, the coverage provided
decreased and the cost of insurance increased.'
65. Id. (explaining that lawyers who obtain insurance on their own initiative
expose themselves and their clients to "potentially dangerous gaps in coverage").
66. Id at 12 (referring to this as a "free-rider" problem that Scandinavian
regulators cited as a reason for requiring that all members obtain insurance).
67. See Bennett J. Wasserman & Krishna J. Shah, Mandatory Legal Malpractice
Insurance: The Time Has Come, N.J. L.J., Jan. 14, 2010 (arguing that the extension of
insurance to all lawyers would make premiums more affordable). "With increased
competition in the insurance marketplace . . . the resulting revenue infusion to
carriers by mandating insurance coverage would not only lower premiums, but it
would extend protection to all clients... ." Id
68. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
69. George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A
Comparative Analysis ofEconomic Institutions, 4 CONN. INs. L.J. 305, 307 (1998); see
also Fredric L. Goldfein, Legal Malpractice Insurance, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1285, 1285
(1988) (noting that it was not until the 1960s that insurers realized that they could
make a profit).
70. See Cohen, supra note 69, at 308 (tracing developments that contributed to
the expansion of lawyers' liability exposure).
71. Insurers radically changed the coverage provided by changing policies to be
"claims-made" rather than occurrence policies and by revising the insuring
agreements to provide for deducting defense costs from the limits of liability
available to pay damages. Id.
72. "In some jurisdictions, such as California, insurers started dropping out of the
legal malpractice insurance market and focusing on more profitable and stable
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By the late 1970s, the market in various states became very
restrictive, making legal malpractice insurance cost prohibitive for
many and unavailable to others.74 Lawyer organizations around the
United States evaluated options to deal with the tough and expensive
insurance market.' In some states, lawyers established bar-related
mutual companies, owned by lawyers, to provide affordable
insurance." In other states, including California and Washington,
lawyers explored the possibility of lowering insurance costs by
requiring all lawyers to purchase insurance. Although the California
governor refused to sign proposed legislation requiring lawyers to
carry insurance, the state of Oregon "borrowed the proposed
California legislation and passed it as its own." On July 1, 1978,
Oregon established a mandatory insurance program in an attempt to
deal with the insurance "crisis" where many lawyers were "simply
unable to obtain insurance at a reasonable price." Thus, Oregon
became the first state in the U.S. to require that all lawyers in private
practice obtain insurance through the state's professional liability
fund (PLF).w
areas." Id. (citing ISSUES IN FORMING A BAR-RELATED PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE COMPANY 4 (ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyers' Professional Liability
ed., 1989)). -
73. See Goldfein, supra note 69, at 1285 ("By the end of the 1970's, premiums
began to increase sharply."). For a description of how "claims-made" coverage is
more restrictive than "occurrence" coverage, see id. at 1286-90.
74. See id. at 1285 (citing Smith, Cautious Optimism-An Overview of Lawyer
Malpractice, 12 B. LEADER 13, 14 (1989)).
75. See Cohen, supra note 69, at 309-31 (chronicling bar initiatives to make
insurance more accessible and affordable).
76. California and North Carolina organized the first bar-related insurance
companies. See id. at 308. Numerous states followed, creating bar-related companies
that write insurance and provide risk management services. For a listing of the bar-
related companies, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BAR-RELATED INSURANCE
COMPANIES, http://www.nabrico.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). As stated on the
website for the National Association of Bar-Related Insurance Companies, affiliated
member companies are "dedicated to personal service, quality coverage, and the
satisfaction of their insureds." Id.
77. "Legislators believed that [mandatory coverage through state-endorsed funds]
would greatly assist a growing number of attorneys who were unable to obtain
insurance, as well as protect clients who were represented by uninsured attorneys."
Goldfein, supra note 69, at 1296.
78. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law
Professors, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2583, 2610 (1996).
79. Goldfein, supra note 69, at 1296; Ramos, supra note 78, at 2610.
80. By legislative enactment, the board of governors for the unified state bar
association has the authority to require all active members of the state bar engaged in
the private practice of law whose principal offices are in Oregon to carry professional
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Interestingly, the Oregon Bar Association originally proposed the
mandatory insurance program with the hope that it would "provide
lower rates, make coverage more available, and protect the public
from harm by uninsured attorneys."" "The Oregon State Bar
Association determined that [the PLF] would cost individual
[lawyers] less than comparable . . . insurance."' In commenting on
the Oregon Bar Association's role in supporting a mandatory
insurance program, one malpractice expert noted that "[a]ltruism, or
concern for the consumer, was not entirely behind Oregon's decision
to establish the PLF."" Lawyers and bar leaders recognized that the
mandatory insurance program made economic sense for lawyers."
In arguing for mandatory legal malpractice insurance,
commentators often point to the success of the Oregon PLF
program." Notwithstanding the Oregon experience in making
insurance and loss prevention services accessible to all lawyers in
private practice, organized bar groups and other interested bodies
have staunchly and successfully opposed mandatory insurance.' As
liability insurance. See OR. REV. STAT. § 752.035 (2011). Currently, the professional
liability fund commission requires that "qualified members of the profession . .. carry
professional liability insurance offered by the fund with primary liability limits of at
least $200,000." Id.
81. Goldfein, supra note 69, at 1296.
82. Nicole A. Cunitz, Note, Mandatory Malpracdce Insurance for Lawyers: Is
There a Possibility of Public Protection Without Compulsion?, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHiCs 637, 652 (1995).
83. Ramos, supra note 78, at 2610.
84. See id. at 2610-12 (analyzing the pricing structure). Although initially met by
heavy criticism, past survey results suggest that members of the Oregon Bar are
satisfied with services provided. See Nicholas A. Marsh, Note, "Bonded & Insured?'"
The Future of Mandatory Insurance Coverage and Disclosure Rules for Kentucky
Attorneys, 92 Ky. L.J. 793, 800 n.56 (2004) (citing the Oregon PLF website that
reported on survey results indicating that 99% of the respondents indicated that they
were "satisfied" and 87% reported that they were "very satisfied" with services
provided by the PLF).
85. See, e.g., Ramos, supra note 78, at 2611-12 (asserting that "Oregon's PLF has
been a success and a model for any insurance carrier"); Cunitz, supra note 82, at 651-
52. In advocating that every state should follow Oregon's example, the vice-
president of an international insurance broker and risk-management consulting
group notes that most of the arguments against mandatory insurance deal mostly
with "logistics, not substance." David Z. Webster, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance,
Yes: It's Essential to Public Trust, 79 A.B.A. J. 44, 44 (1993). Mr. Webster concludes
by stating: "Oregon has solved the logistics problem and, as an added benefit, has
reduced cost and developed a credible loss-control program and a workable claims
statistical base. But most important, Oregon has assured the client public protection
in the event of lawyer malpractice." Id.
86. In explaining why the Oregon model of mandatory insurance has "stayed only
in Oregon," Manuel Ramos summarizes the opposition as follows:
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noted by Professor Leslie Levin, "[w]hile Australia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom have long required lawyers to carry malpractice
insurance, bar resistance to mandatory insurance continues unabated
in the U.S."' Some outspoken opponents of mandatory insurance
would require lawyers to disclose that they do not carry malpractice
insurance.' As discussed in the next section, the debate over a
mandatory disclosure rule reflects different perspectives on consumer
protection and law as a business or profession.
III. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF INSURANCE: WHAT THE
DEBATE REVEALS ABOUT LAWYER ATTITUDES
Following study and examination by bar groups, various states
have rejected proposals for mandatory insurance programs.' As a
middle ground approach to requiring insurance or continuing the
status quo, a number of jurisdictions have adopted rules requiring
that lawyers disclose the fact that they do not carry professional
Lawyers in other states do not like it. The ABA is against it. Insurance
carriers oppose it. Many attorneys would prefer not to pay several thousand
dollars a year in premiums, and believe that the best insurance is to be
"bare": it is cheaper and most plaintiff's attorneys will simply not bother to
prosecute a legal malpractice case against them. Insurance carriers do not
like the idea of legislation that might put them out of business. ALAS, the
nation's largest legal malpractice insurer based on premium income, is
opposed to mandatory insurance because "it simply does not work." The
Alliance of American Insurance is also against mandatory legal malpractice
insurance: "Guaranteeing injured clients the means to collect gets beyond
what the insurance product is designed to do." Because any mandatory ...
insurance program must cover all lawyers, it is unlikely that any insurance
carrier will commit to writing a state's mandatory program. Insurance
companies relegated to offering excess coverage would soon see premium
income decrease substantially. Some might even go out of business.
Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice Insurance The Profession's Dirty Little Secret,
47 VAND. L. REv. 1657, 1728-29 (1994) (footnotes omitted). Professor Ramos
concludes by stating that these arguments against mandatory legal malpractice
insurance are unsupportable from the standpoint of consumer protection. See id
87. Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons
from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 1549, 1588
(2009) (reviewing RICHARD ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING FROM
ATFORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS (2008)).
88. Harry H. Schneider, Jr., Mandatory Malpractice Insurance, No: An Invitation
to Fivolous Suits, 79 A.B.A. J. 45 (1993) (suggesting that insurance disclosure is a
"less divisive and less expensive" way of accomplishing the goal of public protection).
89. See, e.g., Robert I. Johnston & Kathryn Lease Simpson, 0 Brothers, 0
Sisters, Art Thou Insured?, 24 PA. LAW. 28, 30 (2002) (explaining that studies
conducted by the Pennsylvania Bar Association Professional Liability Committee
concluded that a mandatory insurance proposal was not realistic in a state with a bar
the size of Pennsylvania).
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liability insurance." Bar leaders representing large bar associations,
as well as small ones, view mandatory disclosure of insurance status as
a starting point on the road to improving client protection.9'
In the United States, state supreme courts, rather than bar
associations, led the trend to adopt rules of professional conduct that
require that lawyers disclose their lack of insurance.' The Supreme
Court of Alaska broke new ground in 1999 when it became the first
state to amend its professional conduct rules to mandate disclosure of
a lack of insurance.' That same year, South Dakota used a similar
approach in modifying the state professional conduct rules to require
insurance disclosure to clients and potential clients in
communications with them." Within a couple of years, other courts,
including the Supreme Courts of Ohio and New Hampshire, adopted
rules requiring lawyers who lack malpractice insurance to notify their
clients.'
90. For a discussion of insurance "status disclosure" as an ideological compromise
between camps that are concerned about interests of the "lawyers and health of the
legal profession on one side and the rights of the consuming public on the others,"
see Farbod Solaimani, Watching the Chent's Back: A Defense of Mandatory
Insurance Disclosure Laws, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 963,974-75 (2006).
91. Compare James E. Towery, The Case in Favor of Mandatory Disclosure of
Lack ofMalpractice Insurance, 14 PROF. LAW. 22 (2003) (the former president of the
California Bar Association arguing that a lawyer's lack of insurance is a "material
fact" clients are entitled to know), with James C. Gallagher, Should Lawyers Be
Required to Disclose Whether They Have Malpractice Insurance?, 32 VT. B. J. 5
(2006) (former president of the Vermont Bar Association asserting that lawyers
should have to disclose their insurance status because of the heightened obligations
lawyers owe clients).
92. James E. Towery, Should Disclosure of Malpractice Insurance Be Mandatory,
GP SOLO, Apr.-May 2003, available at http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/
publications/gp-solo-magazine-home/gp-solo-magazine-index/towery.html. Mr.
Towery chaired the ABA Standing Committee on Client Protection and served past
president of the State Bar of California. By statute enacted in 1988, California first
required a form of malpractice insurance disclosure in certain fee contracts. Id. This
provision was later "sunsetted" and not reenacted. Id.
93. Jeffrey D. Watters, What They Don't Know Can Hurt Them: Why Clients
Should Know if Their Attorney Does Not Carry Malpractice Insurance, 62 BAYLOR
L. REV. 245, 257 (2010).
94. South Dakota's rule now is considered to be the most stringent reporting
requirement because it requires disclosure to the client or potential client in every
communication with them. Id. The Rule also covers the presentation of the
disclosure and extends the requirements to every advertisement by the attorney,
whether written or in the media. Id.
95. Towery, supra note 92, at 38. In a reported case, the Supreme Court of Ohio
suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for twenty-four months for violations of
the Ohio Professional Conduct Rules, including the rule that required the lawyer to
inform a client, in a writing signed by the client, if the lawyer does not maintain
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While additional state high courts were considering the disclosure
issue, the ABA Client Protection Committee tackled the disclosure
issue. After unsuccessfully floating proposals, including one to
amend the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the Committee
changed its approach and recommended an ABA Model Court Rule
on Insurance Disclosure (ABA Model Court Rule).' Unlike
professional conduct rules that required lawyers to disclose their lack
of insurance directly to clients, the ABA Model Court Rule requires
that lawyers disclose on their annual registration statements whether
they intend to maintain professional liability insurance for their
private law practices.' The ABA Model Court Rule was considered
to be more "lawyer friendly" than the professional conduct rules,
adopted in states such as Alaska and South Dakota, because violation
of a court rule would not subject a lawyer to professional discipline.'
Although the ABA Model Court Rule was "lawyer friendly," it only
passed the House of Delegates by a narrow eleven-vote margin."
As of August 9, 2011, seventeen states have adopted mandatory
disclosure rules that follow the ABA Model Court Rule approach
that requires disclosure on lawyers' annual registration statements,
rather than disclosure directly to clients and prospective clients.
professional liability insurance. See generally Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Trainor, 950
N.E.2d 524 (Ohio 2011).
96. Richard Acello, Climate Change: States Warm to the Disclosure of Liability
Coverage, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/climateschange/.
97. ABA Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure, ABA STANDING COMM. ON
CLIENT PROTECTION (Aug. 9, 2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abal
migrated/cpr/clientprolModelRule_InsuranceDisclosure.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter ABA Model Court Rule].
98. Watters, supra note 93, at 255. Under the ABA Model Court Rule, the highest
court of the jurisdiction will designate the means for making disclosure information
available to the public. ABA Model Court Rule, supra note 97.
99. 5 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 38.1
(2012) (noting that the ABA rule focuses on the "fact and maintenance of insurance"
rather than the amount of insurance).
100. State Implementation of ABA Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure,
ABA STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROTECTION (Aug. 9, 2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/professionaLresponsibil
ity/chart-implementation of_mcrid_080911.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter State
Implementation Chart]. States vary on public access to the information that lawyers
disclose on their registration statements. Some make information available on the
state website, others on request, and others do not allow public access to information.
See Watters, supra note 93, at 256.
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Another seven states require disclosure directly to clients.' HALT,
a self-described legal reform group, strongly urged that states go
beyond the ABA "baseline recommendation" by requiring that
lawyers directly disclose to clients whether or not they carry
malpractice insurance."'
Although the ABA Model Rule attempts to balance lawyer and
consumer interests, five states have declined to adopt any version of
an insurance disclosure rule." North Carolina also joined the states
that do not require disclosure. As of January 1, 2010, North Carolina
eliminated the requirement for lawyers to inform the state bar
whether they maintain legal malpractice insurance."
In each state that considered a mandatory insurance disclosure
rule, lawyers passionately asserted arguments supporting their
positions. The arguments articulated in favor of adoption of a rule
largely focused on public protection concerns, while opposing
arguments pointed to the negative consequences of adoption of such
a mandatory disclosure rule. The following synopsis of the main
arguments reveals that the proponents and opponents fundamentally
differ on their perspectives of lawyer duties and the effects of
adopting a rule related to a lawyer's insurance status.
Proponents advance a number of justifications for mandating that
lawyers disclose whether they carry professional liability insurance.
These arguments cover both client protection issues, as well as lawyer
protection issues. A common client protection argument relates to
disparate positions of lawyers and their clients. The vast majority of
lay people enter an attorney-client relationship with little or no
information on a lawyer's insurance status or the lawyer's ability to
pay damages in the event of loss. Unless the person is a sophisticated
101. The following states require disclosure directly to clients: Alaska, California,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. State
Implementation Chart, supra note 100.
102. HALT Status Update: Does Your State Require Lawyers to Make Their
Insurance Status Known, HALT, http://www.halt.org/reform.projects/
lawyeraccountability/pdflMalpractice insurance_disclosure_091505.pdf (last visited
Aug. 23, 2012) [hereinafter HALT Repord. In comments to the Illinois Supreme
Court, HALT argued that disclosure in registration papers merely assures that the
high court will be informed of an attorney's insurance status, but does not guarantee
that clients will have access to the information. Id.
103. The following states have rejected a disclosure rule: Arkansas, Connecticut,
Florida, Kentucky, and Texas. State Implementation Chart, supra note 100.
104. Frequently Asked Questions, N.C. ST. B., http://www.ncbar.gov/faq/ffaq.asp
(last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (noting that clients must check with their lawyers if the
clients want to obtain information on the lawyer's legal malpractice insurance
coverage).
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consumer of legal services, prospective clients likely do not inquire
about insurance. Study results suggest that the majority of consumers
do not know whether lawyers are required to carry professional
liability insurance." Lay consumers may assume that lawyers are
required to carry insurance."
To address the asymmetry and lack of information, proponents
maintain that states should require disclosure when lawyers do not
carry professional liability insurance." This argument is based on the
duty of lawyers to disclose information that is material to
representation. As stated by James Towery, a former president of the
California Bar Association and supporter of mandatory disclosure:
[W]hen a client hires a lawyer, is the lawyer's lack of insurance a
material fact that the client is entitled to know? It is hard to fashion
a persuasive argument that clients are not entitled to that
information. Lawyers operate under a state license, and have a
monopoly on "practicing law." With that monopoly go certain
obligations. Full disclosure to clients of material information
regarding the representation is certainly one of those obligations.'*
The special nature of the attorney-client relationship also militates
in favor of disclosure. Because members of the legal profession have
a "heightened responsibility in business relationships with clients,"
James C. Gallagher, a former president of the Vermont Bar
Association, urged adoption of a mandatory disclosure rule so that
clients can make informed decisions about retaining a lawyer.'"
Unless consumers possess sufficient information on a lawyer's
insurance status, they cannot make an "efficient risk assessment" as
105. According to a public opinion survey conducted for the State Bar of Texas,
eighty-seven percent of respondents reported that they did not ask if their attorneys
carried professional liability insurance. PLI Disclosure Survey of the Public, ST. B.
TEX. (Nov. 2009), http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/PublicSurvey.pdf.
The State Bar of Texas contracted with North Texas State University to conduct a
telephone survey of 500 Texas residents, reflective of the demographics of Texas. Id
106. Devin S. Mills & Galina Petrova, Modeling Optimal Mandates: A Case Study
on the Controversy over Mandatory Professional Liability Coverage and Its
Disclosure, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1029, 1033 (2009) (referring to studies that
reveal that most clients assume that their attorneys are covered).
107. For a analysis of the asymmetric distribution of information in the attorney-
client relationship, see Eli Wald, Taking Attorney-Client Communications (and
Therefore Clents) Seriously, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 747, 751-55 (2008).
108. Towery, supra note 91, at 23 (suggesting those attorneys who question the
materiality of insurance information put the question to a cross-section of their
clients).
109. To support his position, Mr. Gallagher refers to court opinions that describe
the special nature of the lawyer-client relationship. Gallagher, supra note 91, at 5.
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to whether they wish to hire the lawyer.1 o To illustrate this point,
consider the example of a claimant in a large personal injury case
where the claimant is selecting between two different personal injury
lawyers. The lawyers charge the same contingency fee, but one
maintains legal malpractice insurance and the other does not.
Retaining a lawyer without knowing whether the lawyer carries
insurance is like purchasing a car without airbags. Unless the lawyer
has substantial non-exempt assets, there is likely no safety mechanism
to protect the client in the event of lawyer error or misconduct."'
Failure to require disclosure shifts risk of loss to consumers who
rely on the superior position of their lawyers."2 As noted by a
member of the Pennsylvania Professional Liability Committee, clients
with meritorious claims suffer double injury when they are injured,
first by a lawyer who they thought would protect them, and second
when they do not have recourse because the lawyer had no
coverage."'
Often malpractice plaintiffs' lawyers do not pursue actions against
lawyers who do not carry professional liability insurance.1
Recognizing this, practitioners may see "going naked" as an
"effective strategy for avoiding lawsuits but it comes at the cost of
110. Mills & Petrova, supra note 106, at 1034.
111. According to a 2008 public opinion survey conducted by the State Bar of
Texas Task Force on Insurance Disclosure, eighty percent of respondents indicated
that it was "very important" or "moderately important" for them to know whether
the attorney they are hiring carries insurance. Watters, supra note 93, at 247. In
addition, seventy percent of the respondents agreed that lawyers should inform
potential clients whether or not the lawyer carries insurance. Id. at 247-48.
112. See Mills & Petrova, supra note 106, at 1032-33 ("Not requiring malpractice
insurance, and not requiring attorneys to disclose any lack of coverage, unfairly
forces legal clients to bear the burden of risk of loss .... Furthermore, when lawyers
are the casual agents of malpractice damages, and their clients are the victims, it
seems incongruous that potential victims should be the ones to carry the risk of
malpractice resulting in financial loss.").
113. Johnston & Simpson, supra note 89, at 32; see also Nicole D. Mignone,
Comment, The Emperor's New Clothes? Cloaking Client Protection Under the New
Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1069, 1083 (2005)
(noting that the grievance process inadequately provides financial compensation for
aggrieved clients). In most states, Client Protection Fund programs provide limited
recovery for a narrow class of claims. For a discussion of the scope of coverage
protected by client protection funds, see LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG,
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACrICE OF LAW 148 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining that
client protection funds are state-sponsored programs designed to reimburse clients
whose lawyers have stolen their money). "Many client protection funds reimburse
only a fraction of the valid claims that are submitted to them." Id. at 152.
114. "Legal malpractice cases are rarely pursued against an uninsured attorney
unless that attorney has significant assets." Ramos, supra note 86, at 1727.
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protecting the interests of clients."115  As explained by Robert
Fellmeth, Executive Director of the Center for Public Interest Law at
the University of San Diego School of Law:
When you run naked it means you're immune-no one's going to
sue you. Malpractice attorneys don't sue attorneys who don't have
coverage. What's the point of getting a judgment and you don't
know whether you can execute on it? Attorneys know how to hide
assets. If you're a marginal practitioner, it pays to go naked. So the
consumer has no recourse, and it's a disgrace.
The likelihood of being injured by an uninsured lawyer is
significant because a substantial percentage of lawyers do not carry
professional liability insurance."' Although there is a great deal of
speculation on the number of uninsured lawyers in private practice,
surveys suggest that the percentages of uninsured attorneys range
from seventeen percent to forty-eight percent. 18
The adoption of mandatory insurance disclosure rules reduces the
number of uninsured lawyers by creating incentives for lawyers to buy
insurance."" First, the "strategy of going naked" becomes far less
attractive if lawyers must disclose that they do not carry insurance.
Second, the prospect of having to disclose one's insurance status may
help lawyers recognize that costs associated with insurance coverage
are part of the costs of practicing law.
Some proponents also assert that mandatory disclosure rules deter
lawyer misconduct. The deterrence argument is based on the
assumption that lawyers will engage in risk management in an effort
115. Acello, supra note 96 (quoting Robert Fellmeth).
116. Id.
117. See Johnston & Simpson, supra note 89, at 28 (noting that in 2001 the
insurance industry and bar officials estimated that the percentage of uninsured
lawyers in the United States ranged from twenty percent to fifty percent at any given
time).
118. The lower end of this estimate is based on findings in a mandatory survey of
lawyers conducted at the direction of the Illinois Supreme Court. Id at 29 (quoting
the chief counsel of the Illinois State Bar Association who noted that that the
"general feeling was that something needs to be done" even though the numbers
came in slightly better than projected). The upper end of the estimate derives from
6,160 responses to a Professional Liability Survey distributed by the State Bar of
Texas in 2008. See PLI Disclosure-Attorney Survey Fdings, ST. B. TEx. (Feb.
2008), http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/1 lAttorneySurvey_0208.pdf.
119. After South Dakota adopted a mandatory disclosure rule the number of
insured attorneys in the state rose from eighty percent to ninety-six percent. Carole J.
Buckner, Malpractice Insurance Disclosure Lurches Toward Approval, ORANGE
CouNTY LAw, April 2008, at 51.
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to avoid premium increases.'" The positive effects of purchasing
insurance first occur when an uninsured lawyer applies for insurance,
completing application questions that require a description of practice
management controls such as conflict and calendar systems.
Thereafter, insurers may provide risk management guidance and
assist the insured in properly handling situations after the lawyers
report errors to their carriers.121
Many insured lawyers support mandatory disclosure rules. These
lawyers have observed how innocent lawyers get sucked into
litigation when the actual tortfeasors do not carry insurance." The
increased number of malpractice claims makes this more of a threat
for responsible lawyers who carry insurance."
Finally, proponents argue that disclosure rules balance lawyer
autonomy and client protection." Mandatory disclosure rules allow
lawyers to elect to purchase insurance or disclose their insurance
status. At the same time, consumers of legal services are provided
information so that they can make informed choices. Once lawyers
disclose their insurance status, consumers can make the choice to
retain other counsel, disregard the lack of insurance, or to request
that the lawyer obtain coverage." Thus, mandatory disclosure rules
give consumers choices. At the same time, disclosure rules do not
force lawyers to purchase malpractice insurance, but create incentives
for them to do so.
120. Mignone, supra note 113, at 1083 (suggesting that disclosure rules would lead
attorneys to deliver legal services with greater care).
121. See Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liabihty Insurers as Regulators of Law
Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 220-25 (1996) (describing the types and
effectiveness of risk management programs conducted by insurers).
122. See Johnston & Simpson, supra note 89, at 32 (explaining that members of the
Pennsylvania Professional Liability Committee have seen responsible lawyers drawn
into malpractice suits because another lawyer involved in the matter proved to be
uninsured).
123. Mills & Petrova, supra note 106, at 1033 (citing Ronald E. Mallen, Cutting
Through the Malpractice Maze, THE BRIEF, Summer 1986, at 10, 12-13). For a
discussion of the statistical evidence of a dramatic increase in legal malpractice
claims, see Judith L. Maute, Bar Associations, Sef-Regulation and Consumer
Protection Whither Thou Goest?, J. PROF. LAw. 2008, at 66-69.
124. See, e.g., Solaimani, supra note 90, at 974-75 (analyzing whether mandatory
insurance disclosure is a "perfect ideological compromise" between client and lawyer
interests).
125. Arguably, a "materiality-based" communications rule, such as one advocated
by Professor Eli Wald, would cover a disclosure of a lawyer's insurance status. See
Wald, supra note 107, at 751-55, 779-80 (justifying a "materiality-based" disclosure
rule on the basis of the nature of the attorney-client relationship and the asymmetric
distribution of information in the relationship).
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Lawyers who oppose mandatory disclosure rules do not see those
rules as a compromise that preserves lawyer independence." Rather
they assert that disclosure rules intrude on the choices lawyers should
be able to make in representing clients.127 Specifically, they argue that
mandatory disclosure rules interfere with a practitioner's autonomy
to decide whether to self-insure or purchase insurance." By opening
the door to more regulation of the business aspects of running a law
practice, some fear that mandating disclosure is the beginning of a
slippery slope of more restrictions on how lawyers practice.1
Another concern related to lawyer independence is that mandatory
insurance disclosure rules give too much power to insurance
companies."s
Those who oppose mandatory disclosure maintain that proponents
have failed to demonstrate an actual need for mandating disclosure of
insurance status. Specifically, they point to the lack of evidence for
widespread occurrences of legal malpractice committed by uninsured
lawyers."s' Opponents also argue that a mandatory disclosure rule is
unnecessary because consumers may always inquire as to whether a
lawyer carries insurance.132 Opponents maintain that consumers
126. See, e.g., Charles Wood, Few Fans of Mandatory Disclosure, MoNT. LAW.,
June-July 2002, at 11 (referring to opposition of Montana attorneys who argued that
mandating insurance disclosure was "playing into the hands of the malpractice
insurance companies by forcing more lawyers to buy coverage rather than be
embarrassed by a disclosure statement").
127. See Acello, supra note 96, at 41 (referring to a "don't tread on me" attitude
that may be at play in resisting mandatory disclosure).
128. Steve N. Six, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance Disclosure: Is the Time Right
for Kansas?, 72 J. KAN. B. Ass'N 14, 14 (2003) (noting that a mandatory rule makes
no allowance for the fact that some lawyers have adequate financial resources to
cover claims).
129. Mignone, supra note 113, at 1086; see also Mark Hansen, More States Require
Lawyers to Say Whether They Cany Malpractice Insurance, A.B.A. J., May 23, 2006,
available athttp://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/disclosure_rules/.
130. See Hansen, supra note 129. For a discussion of the emerging role of insurers
as regulators of the legal profession, see Davis, supra note 121, at 220-32. See
generally Charles Silver, Professional Liabihty Insurance as Insurance and as Lawyer
Regulation:Response to Davis, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 233 (1996).
131. See Mills & Petrova, supra note 106, at 1034 (articulating the counter
argument that "absence of proof is not the proof of absence"); see also Towery, supra
note 91, at 23 (suggesting that the lack of evidence of unsatisfied judgments against
uninsured lawyers can be attributed to the fact that claims against uninsured lawyers
are "often abandoned, precisely because there is no available insurance").
132. See Wood, supra note 126, at 11 (quoting a Montana attorney who insisted
that potential clients should be accountable for asking about an attorney's insurance
status).
2012] 201
202 FORDHAM URB. L [Vol. XL
consider a variety of factors when retaining counsel, including the
lawyer's experience and disciplinary record."a'
In opposing mandatory disclosure, critics point to a variety of
unintended consequences that arise from mandating disclosure. Most
notably, they warn that more information on insurance will "invite
frivolous lawsuits."" They also argue that the mandatory insurance
rule will eventually increase the cost of legal fees because lawyers
likely would transfer insurance costs to consumers of legal services.
Some of the most vocal critics argue that adoption of mandatory
disclosure rules will disproportionately affect solo and small firm
lawyers.'" They assert that many solo and small firm practitioners
cannot afford insurance and therefore disclosure rules will unfairly
stigmatize them."'
To lawyers familiar with professional liability coverage, the most
persuasive criticism is that mandatory disclosure actually misleads lay
people.1" Because of the claims-made nature of professional liability
insurance, opponents argue that disclosure will adversely affect
clients who assume that coverage exists when it does not."' Unlike
occurrence policies, claims-made policies cover claims that are made
and reported during the policy term. Therefore, lawyers who disclose
133. Edward C. Mendrzycki, Should Disclosure of Malpractice Insurance Be
Mandatory?-Con, GP SoLo, Apr.-May 2003, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp-solo-magazine-home/gp-sol
o.magazine-index/towery.html (asserting that there is "no empirical evidence
showing that simply stating that a lawyer is uninsured offers any useful information to
a client who is making a decision whether to hire counsel").
134. Mignone, supra note 113, at 1086 (referring to opposition expressed by an
ABA delegate). In supporting their position, critics can use the proponents' own
argument that malpractice lawyers do not pursue claims against uninsured
professionals.
135. Cunitz, supra note 82, at 656-57.
136. See Buckner, supra note 119, at 51-52 (noting that opponents of the proposed
disclosure rule "predicted consequences ranging from premium increases, rising costs
for legal services, reduction in availability of low-cost legal services, increases in
malpractice claims and the demise of small firm and solo law practices").
137. Marsh, supra note 84, at 810 (suggesting that stigma is "especially problematic
for attorneys operating on limited budgets" because they may be forced out of
practice if they are required to choose between purchasing insurance and bearing a
negative stigma).
138. For example, in a commentary in opposition to mandatory disclosure, Edward
Mendrzycki, the former chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers'
Professional Liability, identified various features of malpractice policies that could
lead clients to believe that they could recover sums under an attorney's professional
liability policy. See Mendrzycki, supra note 133.
139. See id.
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that they carry insurance at the beginning of the attorney-client
relationship may not be insured at the time that the actual claim is
made and reported.'" Other concerns relate to the fact that limits of
liability, deductibles, insuring agreements, exclusions, and even
conditions vary widely.141 Because of the complexity of professional
liability policies, the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers'
Professional Liability has opposed the adoption of mandatory
disclosure rules because the lack of protection potentially misleads
the client into believing remedies exist to recoup losses.142
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Texas weighed the arguments
related to adoption of a mandatory disclosure rule.143 Following a
recommendation from the Board of Directors of the State Bar of
Texas, the Supreme Court of Texas concluded that it would maintain
the status quo and not adopt any form of disclosure rule.'" This
decision came after a lengthy debate and conflicting
recommendations.1 45 First, in 2008, the State Bar of Texas Task Force
on Insurance Disclosure voted against adoption of an insurance
disclosure rule.'" Within a year, the Grievance Oversight Committee
140. For a discussion of the differences between occurrence and claims-made
policies and other terms of professional liability policies, see Susan Saab Fortney,
Legal Malpractice Insurance: Surviving the Perfect Storm, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 41, 43-
44 (2004).
141. Some argue that "the effort to provide more detailed disclosure addressing
these finer points [of coverage] may cause even more confusion." Gallagher, supra
note 91, at 6.
142. Mignone, supra note 113, at 1084. Many members of the ABA Standing
Committee on Lawyers' Professional Liability are affiliated with professional liability
insurers or law firms that defend legal malpractice cases.
143. See generally Terry Tottenham, Radio Nowhere, 33 TEx. B.J. 728 (2010)
(describing the debate and how the State Bar "worked hard" to engage members in
considering the recommendation to the Supreme Court of Texas).
144. In a letter dated April 14, 2010 to the President of the State Bar of Texas, the
Supreme Court of Texas reported its decision to not adopt an insurance disclosure
rule. Court Decides Against Mandatory Professional-Liability Insurance Disclosure,
TEx. SUP. Cr. (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/
advisories/ProfessionalInsuranceDisclosure_041610.htm.
145. The State Bar of Texas website contains a great deal of information on the
State Bar's consideration of the insurance disclosure issue, including reports from
various bodies and findings from surveys. For a Table of Contents and links to
pertinent documents, see generally Professional Liability Insurance Disclosure-
Table of Contents, ST. B. TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/home.html
(last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
146. By a margin of one vote, the State Bar of Texas Task Force on Insurance
Disclosure recommended against requiring attorneys to inform prospective clients of
whether or not the attorney carried professional liability insurance. Memorandum
from David J. Beck, Chair, Task Force on Insurance Disclosure for State Bar of
Texas Board of Directors (June 11, 2008), available at http://www.texasbar.com
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(GOC), a body appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas,
recommended that the Supreme Court of Texas adopt a rule
requiring that lawyers disclose to their clients the fact that they do not
carry professional liability insurance.147 The Supreme Court of Texas
then asked the State Bar Board of Directors to take a position."4
Before doing so, the Board of Directors conducted a multi-phase
inquiry and study process that included reports, public hearings,
written submissions, blog postings, and published commentaries."
/pliflashdrive/material/3_TaskForce_ReportJuneO8.pdf. The Task Force's due
diligence included surveying lawyers and members of the public. In the survey of
lawyers, seventy-seven percent of respondents were against requiring disclosure of
whether they carried professional liability insurance. In contrast, in the survey of
members of the public, seventy percent reported that they believed that lawyers
should be required to inform a potential client whether they carried professional
liability insurance. Id.
147. The final recommendation of the GOC stated:
The Committee, having studied the recommendations of the State Bar's
Task Force on insurance disclosure, and having reviewed how other states
have addressed these same issues, and after having studied the cost and
availability of professional liability insurance in Texas, recommends that the
State Bar of Texas, at the direction [of] the Texas Supreme Court,
implement a Professional Liability Insurance Disclosure rule. The rule, the
Committee believes, should be made part of the Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct so that any violation of the rule will be handled
through the grievance process ....
GRIEVANCE OvERSIGHT COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS,
EXCERPT FROM THE GRIEVANCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 2009 REPORT TO THE
SUPREME COURT (2009), available at http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/
material/8_Grievance%2OReport.pdf [hereinafter GOC REPORT]. The GOC
provided specific provisions for the proposed disclosure rule, including the
recommendation that the rule require disclosure at the time a client engages a lawyer
when the lawyer does not carry at least $100,000 per claim and $300,000 in the
aggregate." Id. at 6. By way of full disclosure, I previously served as the chairperson
of the GOC. I also participated in some of the GOC's discussions of the mandatory
disclosure rule.
148. Letter from Wallace B. Jefferson, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Texas, to Harper Estes, President, Board of Directors, State Bar of Texas and
Roland Johnson, President Elect, Board of Directors, State Bar of Texas (June 23,
2009), available at http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/materiall
SCt_Letter_062309.pdf.
149. Bar leadership designed the study to obtain information from both attorneys
and members of the bar. Bar directors sought feedback from attorneys by sending
first class letters to their constituents, through the Texas Bar Blog, email submissions,
and responses from State Bar Sections, Committees and local bar associations. See
Execudve Summary, ST. B. TEx., http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/materiall
ExecSummaryFinal.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2012). The TEXAS BAR JOURNAL also
published pro and con commentaries. See generally Chuck Herring & Bill Miller,
Pro/Con Professional Liabihty Insurance Disclosure: Should Be Requred, 72 TEx.
B.J. 822 (2009).
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To obtain the perspectives of consumers of legal services, State Bar
leadership included the public in hearings and conducted a public
opinion survey."so The survey conducted in November 2009 started
with open-ended questions related to the factors respondents
believed were important when hiring lawyers."' In response to these
questions, respondents did not identify professional liability coverage
as a factor.152 When asked a specific question about insurance, forty-
nine percent of respondents indicated that a lawyer's lack of
insurance would affect their decision to hire the lawyer.s' Eighty-
eight percent reported that they would be less likely to hire a lawyer
who does not carry professional liability insurance." Sixty-four
percent also believed that lawyers should be required to disclose to
their clients whether or not they carry professional liability
insurance.ss A somewhat telling fact regarding the importance of
lawyers carrying insurance, thirty-six percent of the respondents
indicated that they would actually pay more in fees in order to ensure
that their lawyer carries professional liability insurance."' Although
most prospective clients might not ask whether a lawyer carries
insurance, these results suggest that many consumers view insurance
status as material information."
150. For the survey report, see ST. B. TEx., supra note 105.
151. The first question was an open-ended one asking, "What are the top five
things you would want to know about an attorney before you would hire them?" Id.
The second question asked, "Of those top five you indicated, which is the most
important to you?" Id.
152. Id. at Question 1. Eleven percent indicated that they had asked if their
attorneys carried professional liability insurance. Id. at Question 4.
153. The question asked, "If a lawyer were to inform you that he or she does not
carry professional liability insurance, would that information affect whether or not
you hire them?" Id at Question 8. Thirty-six percent answered "no" and fifteen
percent indicated "Don't Know/No Response." Id.
154. Id. at Question 9.
155. Id. at Question 13. By comparison sixty-six percent of respondents believed
that doctors should be required to disclose to their clients whether or not they carry
professional liability insurance, and fifty-five percent reported that mechanics should
be required to do so. Id at Questions 14 and 15.
156. Id. at Question 16. A somewhat higher percentage of respondents (forty-nine
percent) indicated that they would pay more in fees to ensure that their doctor
carries professional liability insurance. Id at Question 17.
157. To build on data obtained from the telephone survey and "to gain further
insight into the public's knowledge, understanding and opinions [related to]
professional liability insurance," the State Bar of Texas retained consultants to
conduct focus groups in four Texas cities. ST. B. TEx., supra note 149, at 4. After
hearing a definition of professional liability insurance, seventy percent of the focus
group participants thought attorneys should be required to disclose whether they
carried insurance. See Chris Fick & Greg Liddell, Personal Liabihty Insurance:
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Despite strong public support for a disclosure rule and the GOC
recommendation, the State Bar Board of Directors recommended
against requiring disclosure, siding with the majority of practitioners
who opposed mandatory disclosure." Practitioner opinions voiced in
both written submissions and hearing testimony overwhelmingly
opposed requiring disclosure.' The email invitation soliciting
opinions generated 182 letters and comments, with 83% opposed to
mandatory disclosure, 12% in favor of it, and 5% neutral on the
matter." On the Texas Bar Blog, 92% of comments were opposed to
disclosure and 8% were in favor of disclosure."6 ' Of the eight
responses received from State Bar Sections and Committees, six were
against requiring disclosure and two were neutral. 62 At public
hearings conducted in seven cities, 125 people gave their opinions,
with six indicating that they supported a disclosure requirement,
twelve indicating that they took no position, and 107 opposing a
disclosure requirement."*
To learn more about the basis for the opposition to mandatory
disclosure, I analyzed the hearing testimony as summarized on the
Public Opinion Focus Group Study, HUMAN INTERFACES INC. (Jan. 15, 2010),
http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/SBOT%20FG%2OReportFinalV3.
pdf. The researchers report that this percentage went down to sixty-five percent after
hearing unbiased arguments for and against disclosure. Id at 10-11.
158. State Bar of Texas Board of Directors, Official Minutes, ST. B. TEx. (Jan. 28-
29, 2010), http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=MeetingAgendas.
andMinutes&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFilelD=319. On the
recommendation in question, thirty-nine directors voted against the recommendation
and one voted for the recommendation. Id. If the Supreme Court of Texas
determined that disclosure should be required, the Board of Directors unanimously
approved (with one abstaining) recommending that the Supreme Court adopt an
administrative rule (not a disciplinary rule) that requires each Texas lawyer to
disclose the existence or non-existence of professional liability insurance on the State
Bar of Texas website. Id. With the second recommendation, the Board opted for the
approach that is considered more "lawyer-friendly" because the requirement is set
forth in an administrative, court rule rather than a disciplinary rule. Consumer
advocates also prefer disclosure directly to clients, rather than on a website. See
H4LTReport, supra note 102.
159. For a numerical analysis of the submissions, see ST. B. TEx., supra note 149, at
2-3.
160. Id. at 2.
161. Id. (reporting that ten of the sixteen comments in favor of a disclosure rule
appeared to be from physicians and non-lawyers).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 3. Sixty-one persons testified at the hearings. Id For links to audio
recordings and hearing reports, see ST. B. TEX., supra note 145.
2012] THE ROLE OFA CCOUNTABILITY 207
State Bar of Texas website.'" The largest number of lawyers opposed
the disclosure because there was no evidence of a problem.'" Other
common complaints were that disclosure would be misleading1" and
would increase malpractice suits." Other concerns related to how a
disclosure requirement would unfairly impact segments of the bar and
stigmatize uninsured lawyers. A number of lawyers also referred to
the costs of insurance." Those few who supported adoption of a
disclosure rule tended to make public protection arguments. 16 9
164. See ST. B. TEX., supra note 145. To categorize the positions, I largely relied
on the arguments used by the researchers who conducted focus groups with non-
lawyers in Texas. See Mignone, supra note 113, at 1083-87 (discussing the focus
groups conducted for the State Bar of Texas). Using codes, I identified the up to two
arguments made by each person.
165. As stated by a solo practitioner in the Public Hearing in San Antonio on
October 14, 2009, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." San Antonio-Oct. 14, 2009, ST. B.
TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/PLISanAntonioHearing-
upload.mp3 (last visited Oct. 12,2012).
166. A number of lawyers expressed the concern that disclosure would mislead
clients. As stated by a family law practitioner in Houston, "These are claims-made
policies, not occurrence policies like car insurance. If disclosure were required, the
public would be confused and think, 'If there's a bad result, I can make a claim."'
Houston-Oct. 16, 2009, ST. B. TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/
material/PLIHoustonHearing-upload.mp3 (last visited Oct. 12,2012).
167. As stated in testimony at the Houston Hearing, "A disclosure requirement
would open the floodgates to frivolous litigation." Id. Those who claim that requiring
insurance will "simply put a target on lawyers' backs" may not fully appreciate the
hurdles that plaintiffs must overcome in a legal malpractice case. Experienced
lawyers who handle legal malpractice cases recognize the numerous challenges in
winning a legal malpractice case, including expenses associated with retaining expert
witnesses and establishing causation. These challenges include the "case within the
case requirement" in cases involving civil litigation and the "exoneration
requirement" in cases involving criminal defense work. For a discussion of the
elements and burdens in legal malpractice cases, see SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY &
VINCENT JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION (2008).
See also Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interest of the
Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 491-502 (2008) (using a number of aspects of
legal malpractice cases to show that lawyers "enjoy" several unique advantages when
sued for legal malpractice and that it is much harder to prove legal malpractice cases
compared to medical malpractice cases).
168. See, e.g., Lubbock-Oct. 29, 2009, ST. B. TEx., http://www.texasbar.com/
pliflashdrive/material/PLILubbockHearing-upload.mp3 (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
It is unclear whether those who mentioned "costs of insurance" knew the actual cost
of insurance or if they think that any amount is unreasonable. As noted in the GOC
report, a non-profit insurer in Texas offers special rates for new lawyers with first
year polices costing $500 per year for coverage of $100,000 per claim and a $300,000
limit for claims aggregated. GOC REPORT, supra note 147, at 5. After four years of
practice, the premium goes up to $1,750 per year. Id Because numerous factors go
into premium calculation for experienced attorneys, it is difficult to determine an
average premium for experienced attorneys. The GOC Report noted that an
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An examination of the written comments submitted by email,
letters, and blog postings reveals a similar pattern. Some opponents
of disclosure challenged the public protection justification for
requiring disclosure, asserting that insurance is for the benefit of the
insured.7 o As stated in the letter from the Chair of the Law Practice
Management Committee, "Mandatory disclosure inverts the intention
and beneficiary of coverage . . .. Legal malpractice insurance is not
for the protection of clients or the public but rather the protection of
the insured ... ."2
In stark contrast to the vast majority of submissions, three former
presidents of the State Bar of Texas wrote letters supporting the
adoption of a new rule.17 ' David J. Beck, former bar president and
chair of the State Bar of Texas Task Force on Insurance Disclosure,
explained his support:
Recognizing that there are persuasive arguments on both sides of
the issue, the principal reason I decided in favor of disclosure is that
the issue squarely pits the interests of lawyers on one side against
the interests of the public on the other. I firmly believe that we
informal survey of the members of the Task Force on Insurance Disclosure indicated
that each was paying approximately $4,000 per year. Id.
169. One lawyer who handles legal malpractice cases testified in support of a
mandatory disclosure rule explaining that he approaches the issue "from the
perspective of what's best for the client." Dallas-Oct. 28, 2009, ST. B. TEx.,
http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/PLI DallasHearingupload.mp3
(last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
170. Although it is true that liability policies protect the insured, they only cover
claims for damages brought by third parties. See Third-Party Insurance Definition,
BUSINESDICIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/third-
party-insurance.html#ixzzly8Bk5vcp ("Liability insurance purchased by an insured
(the first party) from an insurer (the second party) for protection against the claims
of another (the third) party. The first party is responsible for its own damages or
losses whether caused by itself or a third party.").
171. Letter from Philip Farlow, Chair of the Law Practice Mgmt. Comm., to Gib
Walton, Attorney, Vinson & Elkins LLP (June 16, 2008), available at
http://www.texasbar.com/pliflashdrive/material/SectionsCommitteesResponses.pdf.
The Chair-Elect of the Council of the General Practice, Solo, and Small Firm Section
warned, "Once the principle that malpractice insurance is for the benefit of the client
or 'the public' and not the insured the next logical implication of that principle is that
malpractice insurance should be mandatory for protection of the client." See Letter
from Wendy Buskop, Chair-Elect, Council of the Gen. Practice, Solo, and Small Firm
Section to State Bar of Texas (n.d.), available at http://www.texasbar.com/
pliflashdrive/material/sectionscommitteesResponses.pdf.
172. See Letter from Broadus A. Spivey, Attorney, to Roland Johnson, President,
State Bar of Texas (Nov. 20, 2009) (on file with author); Letter From W. Frank
Newton to Roland Johnson, President, State Bar of Texas (Dec. 9, 2009) (on file with
author). Mr. Spivey represents plaintiffs in legal malpractice cases and Mr. Newton
manages a non-profit foundation and previously served as a law school dean.
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should come down on the side of the public. Practicing law is a
privilege and our basic goal must be to serve the public. 7
Another Texas lawyer prefaced his comments by noting that he
considers law to be a "profession and not merely a business." 74 The
lawyer described the tension between lawyer and client interests as
follows: "I have heard the arguments expressed by the opponents to
disclosure. I truly feel they simply beg the question and unfortunately
place the attorneys [sic] well-being over that of the clients. In my
mind, that is contrary to our basic obligations."175
The opinions expressed in the Texas debate over a mandatory
disclosure rule reflect lawyers' attitudes about disclosure and financial
accountability for misdeeds. Many lawyers espouse the rhetoric of
professionalism while placing their own financial interests over those
of clients and injured persons. Evidently, they do not agree that
financial accountability is an important aspect of practicing law as a
profession.
CONCLUSION: EMBRACING ACCOUNTABILITY AND
DISTINGUISHING LAW PRACTICE AS A PROFESSION
In discussing limited liability and insurance initiatives, this Article
focuses on the dynamics involved when lawyers have the opportunity
to make choices related to public protection. Reviewing the course of
173. See Letter from David J. Beck, Attorney, Beck Redden & Secrest, to Roland
K. Johnson, President, State Bar of Texas (Dec. 16, 2009) (on file with author). A
director of Public Citizen made a similar observation related to lawyers' special
position, in stating:
Having a law license is an important right. It also is a privilege granted by
the State. Lawyers should be honest and forthright in dealings with clients.
An uninsured lawyer who injures a client is likely to leave the client without
any practical remedy. Texas law requires drivers to have insurance, but
does not require lawyers to have insurance-even though lawyers have
great power and great potential to injure clients financially. This proposed
rule would cost lawyers nothing. It does not require that they carry
insurance. It simply requires honesty and forthright disclosure of insurance
status. Texas consumers are entitled to at least that much information.
See Letter from Tom "Smitty" Smith, Dir., Pub. Citizen, Texas Office, to Roland K.
Johnson, President, State Bar of Texas (Dec. 30, 2009) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Public Citizen Letter].
174. See Letter from Roger W. Anderson, Attorney, Gillen & Anderson, to State
Bar of Texas (Oct. 16,2009) (on file with author).
175. Id.
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events reveals that lawyers have tended to elevate their own self-
interest over consumer interests.176
The birth and growth of the LLP form illustrates that no organized
group played a role in articulating the interests and concerns of
consumers of legal services and other persons injured by lawyer
malpractice. The LLP legislation apparently swept through the
United States under the radar of consumer advocacy groups.
Because many states do not restrict the LLP structure to
professionals, allowing a variety of enterprises to organize as LLPs
benefitted experienced consumers of legal services, such as business
owners." Moreover, sophisticated users of legal services, such as
corporations, did not need to rely on unlimited liability of general
partnerships when retaining lawyers. In engaging counsel, such
consumers could protect their own interests by requiring their lawyers
to maintain malpractice insurance as a condition of employment. 78
Therefore, the persons left without protection were inexperienced
users of legal services who may have assumed that lawyers carry
insurance.'" Such consumers likely do not know the effect and
consequences of their lawyers practicing in LLPs.1so
Regardless of legislative action, state supreme courts could have
taken steps to prohibit or regulate lawyers practicing in LLPs. Using
their inherent authority, the courts could have refused to recognize
the LLP shield or required additional safeguards as a condition of
176. In a survey conducted by the Utah Bar Association, thirty-two percent of the
attorney-respondents agreed with the statement, "The public believes that attorneys
put their own interests ahead of their clients," and nine percent "strongly agreed"
with the statement. Utah State Bar, 2001 SURVEY OF MEMBERS, Questionnaire 2,
Question 51, available at http://www.utahbar.org/documents/2011-SurveyOf
Attorneys.pdf.
177. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 9, § 2.03(a)(3) (describing the types of
business that may organize as LLPs under state laws).
178. Corporations have increasingly dictated the terms of engagement in Outside
Counsel (OC) Guidelines. These guidelines cover a range of concerns, including
insurance, billing, and staffing. For a fascinating analysis of OC Guidelines' influence
on the conduct of lawyers, see generally Christopher J. Whelan & Neta Ziv,
Privatining Professionalism: Client Control of Lawyers'Ethics, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
2577 (2012).
179. In a November 2009 public opinion survey conducted for the State Bar of
Texas, 87.1% of respondents indicated that they did not ask their attorneys whether
the attorneys carried professional liability insurance. See ST. B. TEX., supra note 105.
Approximately 70% of the 500 respondents indicated that they did not know if their
attorneys carried professional liability insurance. Id. at Question 5.
180. According to a survey I conducted of members of the Austin Chamber of
Commerce in June 1996, 91.27% of the respondents did not understand the effect of
law firms practicing as LLPs or LLCs. See Fortney, supra note 8, at 752 n.158.
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allowing firm principals to limit their vicarious liability. The majority
of high courts did not use their authority to regulate law practice, but
simply allowed firm partners to limit their liability and practice as if
they were members of business organizations, rather than
professional organizations with special responsibilities."'
Various considerations may explain the failure of courts to do
more with respect to client protection. First, the vast majority of
judges practiced law before assuming their judicial positions. These
judges may have empathized with firm principals' desire to limit their
liability." Second, in states with judicial elections, judges rely heavily
on financial and other support from the practicing bar." Third,
individual judges may not have focused on the changing economics of
law firms and the consequences of eliminating vicarious liability for
thinly capitalized firms. Finally, on a more subconscious level, judges
may make decisions that favor lawyer interests over public interests
because judges respond to the world as lawyers."
A small number of state supreme courts carefully considered the
consequences of lawyers practicing in LLPs. For example, the Illinois
Supreme Court took steps to provide some degree of public
protection by imposing adequate insurance requirements for limited
liability firms, determined on a per-lawyer basis. By doing so, the
181. As noted by Professor Wolfram, most courts have not been involved in the
LLP adoption process in any way and "[iln only a very few states have the courts
played a role in implementing their local legislation that is more consistent with
inherent powers claims." Wolfram, supra note 8, at 361-62.
182. See Barton, supra note 167, at 456 (identifying a number of "conscious
factors" that might influence judges to favor the interests of the legal profession:
"[the judges] are all lawyers, many of their friends and colleagues are lawyers, and
(whether they are elected or appointed) they likely have their job in large part
because of the efforts of other lawyers").
183. For a critical analysis of judicial selection and cause for concern about
impartiality, see Judicial Selection in the States, How It Works/Why It Matters, INST.
FOR ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL SYS. (2008), http://iaals.du.edulimages/
wygwam/documents/publications/JudicialSelection_States2008.pdf.
"In the last four election cycles, candidates for state high courts have raised nearly
double the amount raised by candidates in the 1990s." Id. at 4.
184. See Barton, supra note 167, at 456 (using the theory of "new institutionalism"
to explain how judges share with lawyers a set of norms, thought patterns, and
behaviors and that these "deeply ingrained biases, thought-processes, and views of
the world .. .control judicial thinking and outcomes" in a way that is favorable to the
legal profession).
185. Illinois was the last state to adopt a rule allowing lawyers to practice in limited
liability firms. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted this rule after a lengthy debate
and evaluation process in which interested groups submitted position papers. See
supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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Illinois court conditioned the elimination of vicarious liability of firm
partners on their firms carrying insurance at higher levels than the
$100,000-per-firm amount required in the first LLP legislation." In
this sense, insurance became a trade-off for firm principals who
demonstrated their financial responsibility in the form of insurance or
other assets.
Other than Illinois and a few other states that imposed meaningful
insurance requirements, client interests appeared to receive little
attention. This fact is unsurprising for virtually no critics successfully
championed the concerns of consumers of legal services and persons
injured by lawyers' misdeeds.
Consumers should not look to the ABA to protect their interests.
The ABA functions more as a trade group- that represents lawyers'
interests than as a professional group committed to client protection.
Although the ABA states that its mission is "[t]o serve equally our
members, our profession and the public by defending liberty and
delivering justice as the national representative of the legal
profession," the ABA's goals and objectives do not describe
consumer protection concerns. Most revealing is the first goal of the
ABA, which reads "serve our members." When the ABA mission
statement was proposed in 2008, former ABA president Michael
Greco asserted that the mission statement should put the "rule of
law" first." In describing his opposition to the proposed amendment,
he stated:
The issue is whether the American Bar Association from this day
forward will define itself as a trade association or as a noble
profession-whether it's changing its highest priority from serving
the people we are bound to serve or serving our own interests....
The proposed statement will tell the world that the goals lead off
with serving ourselves.'s
Greco's recommendation was rejected and the ABA adopted the
proposed mission statement that puts lawyers first."
186. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
187. See House of Delegates Passionately Debates ABA's Goals, A.B.A. J. (Aug.
12, 2008, 9:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/house of_delegates.
passionately-debates abasgoals/.
188. Id.
189. See id. ("Our members are the soul of this association. Our members are
those who we are bound to serve." (quoting the incoming chair of the ABA's
membership committee defending the proposed mission) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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THE ROLE OFA CCOUNTABILITY
Within the ABA there are pockets of consumer-minded
individuals, such as the ABA Standing Committee on Client
Protection." These groups have supported initiatives such as the
ABA Model Rule that requires lawyers to disclose their lack of
insurance."' Despite the diligent efforts of these groups, strong
sectors within the bar convinced a number of state supreme courts to
not adopt a mandatory disclosure rule." Evidently, decision-makers
in states that declined to pass mandatory disclosure rules were not
persuaded that such a rule was necessary to protect consumers or
those lawyers who act responsibly in carrying insurance."
While courts will continue to assume primary responsibility for
lawyer regulation, lawyers may face legislative action." For example,
proponents of mandatory disclosure have threatened to resurrect a
bill proposed by a Texas legislator.'" Now that the Supreme Court of
Texas has declined to adopt a disclosure rule, the proposed legislation
may garner more support from those who believe that lawyers
elevated their own interests above the public interest."
190. For a description of the charge of the ABA Standing Committee on Client
Protection, see Who We Are, STANDING CoMMITTEES: CLIENT PROTECTION,
http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=SC105020&new (last visited
Aug. 24, 2012).
191. In 2004, the ABA Standing Committee recommended the Model Rule on
Insurance Disclosure that the ABA House of Delegates approved by a slim margin.
See Mills & Petrova, supra note 106, at 1036-37 (chronicling the Committee's effort).
192. For example, in Texas, state bar sections, committees, and local bar
associations overwhelmingly opposed adoption of a mandatory disclosure rule.
According to its Executive Summary, the State Bar of Texas received eight responses
"from State Bar Sections and Committees with six [against a mandatory disclosure
rule] and two neutral. . . . Likewise, six responses were received from local bar
associations with five against (in the form of resolutions and polls) and one neutral
(an informational newsletter article)." ST. B. TEx., supra note 149.
193. In professional liability litigation, the burden may fall on the shoulders of
insured lawyers when plaintiffs do not pursue claims against uninsured lawyers.
194. James Fischer, External Control Over the Amercan Bar, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICs 59, 108 (2006) (suggesting that there may be increased flashpoints between
legislators and the bar over lawyers' professional and public duties).
195. See, e.g., Public Citizen Letter, supra note 173 (warning that the Texas
legislature was likely to address the insurance disclosure issue if the Supreme Court
of Texas did not do so).
196. See Herring & Miller, supra note 149, at 822 (noting that the previously
proposed legislation did not move forward because it appeared as if the court would
mandate disclosure). In warning that the "days of self-regulation may be numbered,"
Professor Fischer explains that self-regulation may become a "victim of lawyer
success or, as some critics would have it, lawyer excess." Fischer, supra note 194, at
109.
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In the long run, the support for various consumer protection
initiatives will increase if more lawyers view financial responsibility as
a defining feature of professional practice. Currently, there appears
to be no consensus on the ethical and professional dimensions of
lawyer accountability. For example, one distinguished bar leader
opposed the adoption of a disciplinary rule that required lawyers to
disclose their insurance status, asserting that neither the purchase of
insurance nor the failure to purchase insurance implicates "ethical
tenets."" Beyond the ethics rules that represent minimum standards
to avoid professional discipline, professionalism creeds often refer
generally to civility and public service, with limited attention to client
protection concerns.'"
Law school educators and bar leaders should challenge lawyers to
examine the role that client protection plays in professional practice.
Starting in law school, professors should devote more attention to
legal malpractice and the importance of lawyers being accountable
for their acts and omissions. " In regulating lawyers, courts should
hold them to strict accountability for the performance and observance
of their professional duties.o Finally, those who espouse the status of
law as a profession should recognize financial responsibility as a
professional virtue and promote it as such."'
197. See Mendrzycki, supra note 133, at 37. Mr. Mendrzycki chaired the ABA
Standing Committee on Lawyer's Professional Liability.
198. See, e.g., The Supreme Court of Ohio Commission on Professionalism,
Professionalism CLE Guidelines, adopted June 14, 2002,
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/CP/guidelines.pdf (surveying various
definitions of professionalism).
199. See Ramos, supra note 78, at 2618-23 (suggesting that the failure to cover
legal malpractice in law school amounts to a form of malpractice by law school
professors). At the Fordham-Touro Symposium, The Law: Business or Profession?, I
circulated a short questionnaire asking professors about coverage in their
professional responsibility classes. In the small sample, only two professors answered
the following question in the affirmative, "In your classes, do you discuss whether
lawyers have a professional responsibility to cover damages arising from their acts or
omissions?" Nine reported that they did not cover the topic, with one professor
noting that s/he does not "directly" cover the topic and that it "seems pretty
obvious." Another indicated that s/he "sometimes" discusses the issues. See Survey
from Fordham-Touro Symposium, The Law: Business or Profession? (Apr. 23-24,
2012) (on file with author).
200. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 91, at 5 (quoting court opinions that
underscored responsibilities that lawyer-fiduciaries owe clients).
201. For an interdisciplinary analysis of the common characteristics of
professionals, see Sande L. Buhai, Profession: A Definition, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
241 (2012); Debra Lyn Bassett, Redefining the "Pubic"Profession, 36 RUTGERS L.J.
721, 771 (2005).
THE ROLE OFACCOUNTABILITY
If we fail to protect those who rely on us, we fail to fulfill our
obligations as a protected profession. As former ABA president
Michael Greco suggested, the choice is ours.' Will lawyers function
as a trade group protecting their own personal interests over public
interests, or will lawyers embrace accountability as a defining
attribute of law as a profession? To answer this question, we need
not take a position that law is a business or profession.' Rather, law
is a business of relationships in which lawyers' conduct should be
guided by professional ideals and values. What distinguishes the
practice of law from other business pursuits is how we treat, and
remain accountable, to those who trust us.
202. See House of Delegates Passionately Debates ABA's Goals, supra note 187.
203. See Christine Parker, Law Finns Incorporated: How Incorporation Could and
Should Make Firms More Ethically Responsible, 23 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 347, 380
(2004) (suggesting that there is no justification for drawing stark distinctions between
law as a business and profession).
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